Department of Sociology

The young have always been one of the best indicators of social change and frequently the force driving it. We aim to introduce the results of a recently finished research on the MYPLACE project for Croatia analysing the historical and cultural contextualization of young people's political heritage and social participation. MYPLACE (Memory, Youth, Political Legacy and Civic Engagement) is a FP7 European comparative project which explores how young people's social consciousness is shaped by the shadows (past, present and future) of totalitarianism and populism in Europe. The research is composed of a social survey drawing upon the sample made of 1216 individuals between 16 and 25 years and a qualitative analysis of 61 in-depth interviews.
The research is focused on the generation which grew up in a time of a political, social and economic transition and whose historical memory of totalitarianism, the breakup of Yugoslavia and the Balkan wars is almost solely transmitted memory. That generation faces an unsecure future in Croatia today, with the third greatest youth unemployment rate in the EU and economy without recovery in sight. It is well known that this can push people to a greater susceptibility to radical politics and that younger people without much political experience and historical knowledge are a vulnerable group. We aim to present the findings on the legacy of some of the crucial points of political heritage – socialism and the war in Croatia, as well as opinions and disputes on democracy in Croatia today and the susceptibility to radical politics.

Abstract:
In this paper we aim to explore the inclinations of youth in Croatia to populism and to understand their sources. The contemporary debate on populism could be more important than ever, with 2014 European parliament elections results which can be seen as the herald of the ‘new strength’ of populist forces in Europe. At the same time, populism is a rarely researched phenomenon in Croatia (Milardović 2004; Zakošek, 2010; Šalaj 2012), and to our knowledge our paper is the first comprehensive demand-side analysis. Drawing on the results of the MYPLACE project in Croatia, a research with a combined methodology, we used the data obtained with a social survey undertaken on the sample made of 1216 individuals between 16 and 25 years and a qualitative analysis of 61 in-depth interviews, conducted in 2013.

Populism is a complex phenomenon which must be analysed in relation to the broader political system and cultural context. Thus, it is important to emphasize that our results are situated in the context of Croatian youths’ general discontent with politics and politicians and strikingly low trust in institutions. The qualitative analysis showed that attitudes like these grow deep - the young are mostly alienated from the political system. They hold the political elites as highly corrupted and incapable for pulling Croatia out of the economic crisis. Our respondents recognised and condemned (mainstream) populist strategies among the main political parties, mostly on the basis of politics without real substance, and politicians giving promises they know they can’t or even don’t intend to keep.

In our search for the ‘breeding ground’ for (radical) populism, we focused on finding analogies with three core concepts of populism: the good people, the bad elite and the general will (Mudde, 2004), as it would be helpful for the populist actors if the electorate shares their values. The perspective that the elite is corrupted (the bad elite), was almost undivided among our respondents, and quite strong. Interviewees often stressed the need for a political system where people would be listened more, would have more influence on politics and expressed the opinion that public referenda should have a more important role, which brings us to the other two core concepts of (radical) populism: populist emphasis on the general will and the perception of ‘people’ as good/righteous political actors. Given the (relative) lack of radical populist actors in Croatia, in an effort to understand the potential ‘breeding ground’ for populism in Croatia, we tried to understand the main radical ideologies which have been proven as related to populism. Qualitative analysis showed our respondents’ perception of a wide spread of usual suspect ideological features of populism among Croats - nationalism/nativism and radical egalitarianism.

Since less than 2% of our respondents have ever voted for a more radical political option, it was very interesting to see that a small majority of the survey respondents expressed a positive attitude towards a system with a strong leader who is not constrained by parliament (responses fairly or very good - 55%). Interviews also showed that a part of the youth desire strong leadership from few people or even from one ‘strong leader’ unconstrained by democratic procedures, and we believe that in Croatia that path dominantly leads to populism and not some kind of elitism. We choose the strong leader variable as a proxy for the regression analysis of populism because of the great importance of strong leaders for populist parties. Much has been written on populist aim to function unconstrained from the institutions and rules of the democratic process, and from the political elites who both construct and follow the liberal democratic rules.

Regression results indicate that two predictors – attitudes towards politicians’ corruption and justification of political violence had an important unique contribution in explaining the criteria of preference for a strong leader not constrained by the parliament. The importance of criteria of politicians’ corruption for the explanation of preference for a strong leader is in line with the importance of anti-elitist and anti-systemic attitudes for the definition of the construct of radical populism. Every radicalism and populism in particular, above all, thrives on anti-elitist and anti-systemic attitudes (e.g. Canovan, 1999; Meny & Surel, 2002; Arditi, 2002; Mudde, 2007). Justification of violence for various political purposes (e.g. to overthrow a government, to protect jobs from being cut, to protect an ethnic/racial group etc.) has shown to be the second strongest unique contributor for the explanation of preference for a strong leader. Using violence as means for achieving the end is an important part of radical nativist, anti-immigrant and xenophobic ideologies. Attitudes which correspond to those ideologies were shown as important predictors of populism in previous research (eg. Mudde, 2007; Flecker et al., 2004, Norris, 2005; Turner, 2009; Kymlicka, 2003).

Regression results show a slight skew on the ideological spectrum of youth who are more inclined to support strong leaders. They tend to place themselves more on the right-wing of the political spectrum (r=0,12; p<0,01). The right-wing voters in Croatia usually have stronger nationalist/nativist feelings, stronger religious identity (Zakošek, 2010) and reduced tolerance towards ethnic minorities (Henjak, 2005). Significant negative correlation of attitudes towards minorities with preference for a strong leader (r=-0,16; p<0,01) was also established.

In conclusion, this research has found that the ‘breeding ground’ for populism in Croatia definitely exists among the youth. It appears as a part of the youth is willing to accept any change to give them hope for better political leadership and a better life, even if it means rejecting the representative democratic system and choosing a strong leader to govern the country. Still, for a long time there were no relevant radical populist actors and parties in Croatia. We hold that as an ‘supply-side’ explanations issue, perhaps the most important factor being the institutional and the political influence of European Union. Newest political developments, primarily the fast success of Ivan Vilibor Sinčić, a 24-year old populist presidential candidate who advocated a return to semi-presidential system and strongly rejected political and economic elites should be viewed in that framework.

A number of recent international studies have reported the growing electoral success of populist parties among younger age groups. In this study, authors analysed the " breeding ground " for populism among the youth in Zagreb using the results of the Memory, Youth, Political Legacy and Civic Engagement (MYPLACE) project in Croatia. A mixed methods approach was employed with thematic analysis of 61 semi-structured interviews and regression analysis on a survey sample data of 1,216 young people aged 16–25. Qualitative analysis indicated analogies to Cas Mudde's three core concepts of populism (the " good people " , the " bad elite " and the " general will ") among interviewees' opinions. In addition, common ideological features of populism (nationalism and radical egalitarianism) were to a degree present among the interviewees' attitudes. In the quantitative part of this paper, the authors narrowed the analysis of populism to the radical right variant of populism, and – given the lack of prominent populist actors in Croatia – to support of ideas rather than political parties. The attitude towards a political system with a strong leader not constrained by parliament was chosen as the outcome since it holds significant populist potential in contemporary democracies. Analyses showed the connection of the anti-elite, anti-systemic attitudes – as well as authoritarianism and a few right-wing political attitudes – with the strong leader preference. Both qualitative and quantitative results of this study indicated that the " breeding ground " for populism exists among the youth in Zagreb. Additional research is required to further examine that complex and previously unexplored topic.

The literature on compliance in small scale fisheries provides evidence of the normative foundations of fishers’ behaviour. However, the mechanisms through which normative reasoning translates into non-compliance remains unclear due to the tendency to conceive non-compliant behaviour simply as an outcome of ‘moral deficit’. This paper identifies such mechanisms by focusing on moral reasons which undermine the legitimacy of fisheries regulations. Taking the case of Lake Victoria, East Africa, the paper explores how non-compliance can be founded on diverse and competing concepts of fairness by creating a typology of the modes of justification used by respondents who engage in illegal fishing. The paper establishes four areas of justification: the principle of superfluousness, the principle of autonomy, the principle of futility, and the principle of necessity. Investigating the evidence for each, the analysis finds that the majority of fisherfolk believe that regulations are necessary and support government action in fisheries management. However, fishers expressed futility in fishing legally, given the extent of illegal fishing, and justified their non-compliant behaviour through reference to the cost of legal fishing compared to illegal and the need for better catches and income associated with illegal fishing.